UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Raymond, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     )
                              )
          Plaintiff,          )
                              )
     v.                       )          Civil Action No. 97-CV-207
                              )
Robert R. Raymond, et al.,    )
                              )
          Defendants.         )
______________________________)

NOW COME defendants Robert R. Raymond and Robert G. Bernhoft, and respectfully move this Court for an order compelling plaintiff United States of America to answer interrogatories and admission requests, and to produce documents.  This motion is made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B), and is based on all the pleadings, records, and files in this case.  The grounds for this motion, as more fully set forth in the accompanying memorandum of law, are that:

(1) defendants have properly served on plaintiff requests for admissions, document production, and answers to written interrogatories pursuant to Rules 33, 34, and 36, Fed. R. Civ. P.;

(2) plaintiff has frivolously objected to nearly all defendants' discovery requests;

(3) defendants have conferred with plaintiff's counsel in a serious attempt to resolve their differences and are at an impasse;

(4) defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to full and complete answers and responses to their discovery requests; and

(5) that defendants are entitled to costs and any other sanctions the Court deems just under Fed.R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

WHEREFORE, defendants Raymond and Bernhoft respectfully pray that this Court order plaintiff United States of America to answer all interrogatories, admit or deny all admissions requests, and produce all requested documents.

FURTHER, defendants respectfully pray for the costs of bringing this motion and other sanctions against plaintiff this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted on this the 15th day of February, in the Year of Our Lord & Saviour Jesus Christ 1999.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     )
                              )
          Plaintiff,          )
                              )
     v.                       )          Civil Action No. 97-CV-207
                              )
Robert R. Raymond, et al.,    )
                              )
          Defendants.         )
______________________________)

Defendants Raymond and Bernhoft have moved this court for an order compelling plaintiff United States of America to answer admissions and interrogatories, and to produce requested documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B).  For the reasons set forth below, defendants have established that good cause exists for the issuance of an order compelling the requested discovery.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This action was commenced by plaintiff, United States of America, on March 3, 1997.  Plaintiff seeks an injunction permanently restraining the defendants, Robert R. Raymond and Robert G. Bernhoft, from organizing or selling the "De-Taxing America Program", an allegedly abusive tax shelter within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6700 and 6701, and from engaging in any conduct that substantially interferes with the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.  (See Complaint, Doc. # 1).  Defendants served a notice to take the depositions of IRS Fictitious Revenue Agent Jeffrey Palmer, IRS Assistant District Counsel Edward G. Langer, U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division Trial Attorneys Teresa Dondlinger Trissell and Robert D. Metcalfe, U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division Section Chief Robert S. Watkins, and Assistant U.S. Attorney General Loretta C. Argrett on July 31, 1997, in response to which Plaintiff filed a motion for protective order on August 13, 1997. (See Docs. 48 and 49).  Oral argument was taken on Plaintiff's motion for protective order on August 25, 1997, and a protective order was granted by the court on September 2, 1997.  (See Doc. 61).  On December 10, 1997, Defendants served a second notice to take the depositions of IRS employees Michael Gibson, Ruth Maze, Reda Perl, Christine Such, Robert E. Brazzil, Jill Wanie, and Fred G. Damaske, in response to which Plaintiff moved for a protective order on December 22, 1997.  (See Doc. 91).  Oral argument was taken on Plaintiff's motion for protective order on January 5, 1998, and such protective order was granted by the court on January 12, 1997.  (See Doc. 103). 

In arguing the aforementioned motions for protective orders, plaintiff suggested to this court that defendants be required to pursue written discovery prior to the "drastic measure" of taking depositions.  (See Transcript, Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, August 25, 1997, p. 38, lines 13-25; p. 39, lines 1-7).  This Court adopted plaintiff's suggestion, and both admonished and invited defendants to pursue written discovery rather than depositions.  (See Transcript, Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, August 25, 1997, p. 62, lines 3-23; Transcript, Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, January 5, 1998, p. 63, lines 4-9, 24-25; p. 64, lines 1-18).  Defendants served such discovery requests upon plaintiff, but plaintiff has responded by objecting to nearly all such requests.  The record demonstrates that plaintiff has objected to all written interrogatories, 787 of 843 requests for admissions, and virtually all requests for document production.

Defendants file this instant motion for an order compelling discovery with regard to discovery requests relating to the question whether or not government actors possessed the requisite delegated authority to bring this action against defendants.  In this respect, defendants have made a conscious choice to litigate these discovery disputes according to the underlying subject matter/purpose of the requests, rather than chronologically, in the interest of argument coherence and judicial economy.  The disputed discovery requests are set forth in full text, with plaintiff's responses immediately following each request, in the document attached hereto as Exhibit A.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.   WHETHER PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO ANSWER DEFENDANTS' DISCOVERY REQUESTS PERTAINING TO DELEGATED AUTHORITY.

II.  WHETHER PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR OBSTRUCTING DEFENDANTS' DISCOVERY BY FRIVOLOUSLY OBJECTING TO NEARLY ALL DEFENDANTS' INDISPUTABLY RELEVANT DISCOVERY REQUESTS PERTAINING TO DELEGATED AUTHORITY.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff United States of America has frivolously objected to nearly all defendants' discovery requests on grounds of relevancy.  The discovery requests so objected to were served on plaintiff to determine, for the record, whether plaintiff's agents possessed the requisite delegated authority to bring this action against defendants.  It is axiomatic and beyond reasonable argument that, once challenged, the United States of America has a legal duty to show the sufficiency of its agents' authority to do a particular official act.  Plaintiff's unthinking refusal to answer defendants' discovery requests pertaining to delegated authority is, therefore, per se frivolous, and plaintiff is rightly ordered by this Court to answer all such discovery requests, pay the costs of bringing this motion, and suffer any sanctions this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.

I.   PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO FULLY ANSWER ALL DEFENDANTS' DISCOVERY REQUESTS PERTAINING TO DELEGATED AUTHORITY, BECAUSE SUCH REQUESTS ARE INDISPUTABLY RELEVANT TO THE UNDERLYING SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS ACTION.

A federal employee must possess delegated authority to perform any particular act; it is axiomatic that an absence of delegated authority means that the act in question was beyond the scope of the employee's duties, and therefore unlawful.  For example, a court reversed a defendant's conviction by holding that Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) acts were void due to lack of delegated authority to schedule drugs under a new statutory scheduling procedure.  See United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1987).  At issue was DEA authority to place certain substances on the federal controlled substances list and thus make possession of such scheduled drugs a crime.  See id.  Under former provisions of law, the U.S. Attorney General possessed this scheduling power and had delegated that authority to the DEA.  See id.  Congress amended the scheduling law in 1984, however, and provided a new statutory procedure by which substances could be placed upon the list through a "bypass" procedure.  See id.  Without "fresh" delegated authority from the Attorney General to schedule drugs under the amendment, the DEA did so and commenced prosecution of parties possessing the newly scheduled drugs.  See id.  Many of these convictions were reversed on appeal because of lack of delegated authority to "schedule" the substances.  See United States v. Pees, 645 F. Supp. 697 (D. Col. 1986); United States v. Hovey, 674 F. Supp. 161 (D. Del. 1987); United States v. Emerson, 846 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F. 2d 283 (9th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587, 589 (10th Cir. 1990).

Delegated authority is essential for every act taken on behalf of the government, and only the officer who has been specifically delegated the requisite authority can do the act contemplated.  See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).  In Giordano, the defendant challenged the validity of a wiretap application made by a subordinate to the Attorney General, when under existing law it could only be approved by the Attorney General and a specially designated assistant.  See id.  The Court held the subordinate's act void, declared the wiretap illegal, and ordered the evidence suppressed.  See id.  Similarly, in United States v. Mott, 37 F.2d 860, 862 (10th Cir. 1930), an incompetent Indian leased some land and received large amounts as royalties, which were held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior.  An agreement made to disburse those funds was held to be without authority:  "Where an executive officer, under his misconstruction of the law, has acted without or beyond the powers given him, the courts have jurisdiction to restore the status quo ante insofar as that may be done" (cites omitted).  See also Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 1940) ("Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law.  Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority").

Furthermore, delegation orders must be published in the Code of Federal Regulations.  See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 1976).  In Gemmill, a group of American Indians were engaged in a demonstration within a federal park.  As a result of the presence and protest of the Indians, park officials closed the park and thereafter arrested the Indians, who were subsequently convicted of trespass.  The decision vacating these convictions was premised upon the lack of delegated authority of the officials who closed the park:

Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly referenced the applicable delegation orders published in the CFR, and noted that no orders delegating park closing authority to subordinates of the Secretary of the Interior had been published therein.  See also Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College of Mining and Technology, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W.2d 681, 684 (1952) ("The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority"); Tulsa Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 468 P.2d 501, 507 (Ok. 1970) ("Public officers possess only such authority as is conferred upon them by law and such authority must be exercised in the manner provided by law"); In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("an unlawful or unauthorized exercise of power does not become legitimated or authorized by reason of habitude"); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("when an officer acts wholly outside the scope of the powers granted to him by statute or constitutional provision, the official's actions have been considered to be unauthorized").

Moreover, powers conferred by Congress on a high government official must be made expressly redelegable by statue or regulation to his subordinates, and failure to actually make such authorized redelegation voids any subsequent acts.  See Lopez-Telles v. I.N.S., 564 F.2d 1302, 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).  There, a deportee alleged that an administrative law judge could refuse to deport him for humanitarian reasons, a reason not permitted by statute or delegation order.  The court rejected this argument, stating that:

Importantly, the rules requiring government employees to have delegated authority to act apply with equal force with respect to the Internal Revenue Code.  For example, in Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1929), the mills and a subordinate revenue agent entered into an informal compromise agreement regarding the tax liability of the mills.  That agreement was held invalid on the ground that the agent lacked delegated authority to make the agreement:

Id.

See also Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941).

When challenged, the burden is on the government to establish its authority, and vague averments that one IRS employee or another is a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury are insufficient to establish that such IRS employee was, in fact, delegated the authority from the Secretary to accomplish the specific act complained of.  See Country Gas Service, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 147, 149-50 (1st Cir. 1969).  Specific acts require specific delegation.  See id.  The taxpayer in Country Gas Service compromised alleged tax liabilities with a revenue agent, but the agent had no delegated authority to agree to such a compromise.  The Court decided the case based on this lack of delegated authority and concluded the agreement was void:

Id.

Even the acts of an IRS District Director are void absent expressly delegated authority to do a particular act.  See Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1146 (4th Cir. 1987).  There, the controversy centered on competing claims to property where one party claimed that a compromise agreement concerning taxes was validly consummated and controlled the outcome of the case.  The court rejected the validity of the agreement, however, because it was consummated by agents lacking delegated authority:

Id.

See also Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 209, 217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Acting in contravention of a regulation governing execution of compromise agreements, the Director was as much without authority to join in the oral agreement with Boulez's counsel as he would have been had power to compromise never been delegated to him"); Thornton v. United States, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9232 (E.D.Pa. 1973) (holding that a jeopardy assessment approved by a group chief rather than the district director was void because the group chief was without delegated authority to make the assessment).

Plaintiff's unavailing mantra that questions of proper delegated authority are not relevant to this action is seemingly grounded in a theory of defacto self-validation; that is to say, grounded in the illegitimate assertion that when the United States of America acts, its acts are conclusively valid even in the face of a specific challenge.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly rejected this presumptuous view.  For example, in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220-21 (1882), the Court voided the United States' claimed title to Arlington, Lee's estate, pursuant to a tax sale.  In ruling against the United States the Court declared that:

Id.

Noting that the United States asserted that a defacto exercise of power was self-validating, the Court went on to correct this egregious misapprehension of the law by observing that:  "If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights."  Id. See also Pierce v. United States ("The Floyd Acceptances"), 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 666, 677 (1869) ("We have no officers in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority").  On this question of assumed power the Court has also stated that:

Regarding the instant discovery dispute, plaintiff had made repeated transparent attempts to foist off as legitimate the tired canard that discovery requests going to the question of delegated authority are irrelevant.  To the contrary, this erroneous, ill-considered, patently frivolous assertion files in the face of not only hundreds of years of established case law, but of the fundamental prerequisites of legitimate state action from time-out-of-mind, as well.

For example, the various declarations tendered in this case by purported officers of the United States are insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, whether United States officers/agents/employees possessed the requisite authority to initiate this action against the defendants.  See Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 554 F.Supp 145 (D. Md. 1982).  But in spite of overwhelming authority to the contrary, plaintiff has previously argued that all it need do is aver that proper authorization and delegated authority existed for this action.  (See Doc. 19, United States' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 21-22).  In some cases this naked averment was supported by the vague declarations of several IRS lawyers, declarations that never affirm that delegation orders were issued, but rather make vague statements that one IRS lawyer or another is "a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury."  (See Doc. 20, Langer Decl., 7).  As United States lawyers know, or should know, however, properly delegated authority must confer and impose a specific power on a subordinate.  Most importantly, the bare assertions of IRS lawyers with respect to who they possess delegated authority from are flatly insufficient:

Therefore, plaintiff's abject refusal to produce the actual delegation orders necessary to empower lower-ranking officials, such as Assistant District Counsel Edward G. Langer, to request that this action be brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7408 on grounds of relevancy is patently frivolous:  "Once it is shown the supervisor possessed the legal authority to order his subordinates to act, the remaining hurdle is a showing that the order was in fact given." Benford, 554 F.Supp. at 145.  In fact, Plaintiff's obstructionist refusal to produce the delegation orders which might establish the sufficiency of the authority of named United States' officers to act against defendants creates the presumption that said officers did not possess the requisite authority, and that said officers' actions were ultra vires, concomitantly depriving this court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case.  As such, defendants' discovery requests bearing on delegated authority are, beyond reasonable argument, relevant to the subject matter of this case, because defendants are expressly permitted to fashion a theory of defense based on all possible information and meritorious legal defenses, including whether or not government actors had the requisite delegated authority to do the acts necessary to investigate defendants and bring suit against them:  "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter . . . which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Moreover, defendants not have only the right, but a legal duty to test government actors' authority to bring this action:

In fact, as clearly set forth in United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949), defendants fail to test government actors' authority to commence the instant action at their peril:  "[A] public officer, in exercising powers conferred upon him by statute and regulation, is bound to follow the mode or manner prescribed.  One who deals with such official is on his notice of possible limitations of authority." Id. at 281.  Plaintiff's cavalier disregard of controlling case law and its obligation under the discovery rules should not be tolerated.  An order compelling plaintiff to answer defendants discovery is justified by uncontroverted law, common sense, and the facts of this case.

II. PLAINTIFF IS JUSTLY SANCTIONED FOR OBSTRUCTING DEFENDANTS' DISCOVERY BY FRIVOLOUSLY OBJECTING TO INDISPUTABLY RELEVANT DISCOVERY REQUESTS PERTAINING TO DELEGATED AUTHORITY.

Plaintiff United States of America has a paramount obligation to observe the norms of civil litigation because of the public nature of the actions it brings and the concomitant litigation it involves itself in.  This moral obligation inheres in government lawyers who represent the United States of America, and therefore the public interest, and compels them to avoid obstructionist conduct relating to discovery - particularly when the requested discovery relates to the delegated authority of its agents/officers/employees.  This is so because in a republic under law, the actions of government officials must be lawful in order that public respect for the law be not undermined.

Plaintiff breeds public contempt for the law when it refuses to answer timely and properly drafted discovery requests designed to test government actors' authority to do acts necessary to bring civil actions against American men and women.  Obstructionist conduct by government lawyers must be sanctioned in order that confidence in the law and our legal institutions to justly adjudicate disputes will be bolstered rather than dangerously undermined.  Sanctioning plaintiff United States of America for the instant discovery violations will affect the conduct of U.S. Department of Justice lawyers not only in this action, but in future actions, as well.  Because such prospective effect is desirable and necessary, sanctions are justly imposed on plaintiff for the instant discovery violations.

CONCLUSION

The IRS employees and other named United States' officers must demonstrate they possessed specific delegated authority, based upon statutes, regulations, and delegation orders, that empowered them to bring this civil action against the defendants pursuant to the authorization mandates of 26 U.S.C. § 7408.  The absence of such specific delegated authority would compel a holding that these agents' acts were unauthorized, and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.  Axiomatically then, such discovery requests are relevant to the subject matter of this case, and this court is justified in ordering plaintiff to answer the disputed discovery.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons, defendants Raymond and Bernhoft respectfully pray that this Court order plaintiff United States of America to answer all interrogatories, admit or deny all admissions requests, and produce all requested documents set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto.

FURTHER, defendants respectfully pray for the costs of bringing this motion and other sanctions against plaintiff this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted on this the 16th day of February, in the Year of Our Lord & Saviour Jesus Christ 1999.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     )
                              )
          Plaintiff,          )
                              )
     v.                       )          Civil Action No. 97-CV-207
                              )
Robert R. Raymond, et al.,    )
                              )
          Defendants.         )
______________________________)

DEFENDANT BERNHOFT'S LOCAL RULE 6.02 STATEMENT

On October 14, 1998 at 11:33 a.m. Central Standard Time, defendant Robert G. Bernhoft conferred via telephone with Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, in her capacity as counsel for plaintiff United States of America.  During the conversation, Ms. Trissell was located in Washington, D.C., and defendant Bernhoft was located in Madison, Wisconsin.  The parties discussed the fact that plaintiff had objected to nearly all of defendants' discovery requests to that date, including requests for admissions, written interrogatories, and document production requests, and further, Bernhoft's position that he was entitled to full responses.  Ms. Trissell indicated that plaintiff's refusal to answer any discovery requests it had objected to on relevancy or privilege grounds was a final position, and that there would be no future reconsideration of that final position.  Accordingly, the parties were unable to reach an accord on this issue, and are at an impasse.

Further, on February 4, 1999, at 12:15 p.m. Central Standard Time, defendant Bernhoft conferred again with Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, in her capacity as counsel for plaintiff United States of America, in an effort to resolve disputed discovery requests made by defendants after the October 14th conference.  During this second conversation, Ms. Trissell was located in Washington, D.C., and defendant Bernhoft was located in Richfield, Wisconsin.  The parties discussed the fact that plaintiff had again objected to nearly all of defendants' discovery requests after the October 14th conference, including requests for admissions, written interrogatories, and document production requests.  Bernhoft stated his position that he was entitled to full responses to these requests, but Ms. Trissell again indicated that plaintiff's refusal to answer any discovery requests it had objected to on relevancy or privilege grounds was a final position, and that there would be no future reconsideration of that final position.  Accordingly, the parties were unable to reach an accord on this issue, and are at an impasse.

Dated on this the fifth day of February, A.D. 1999.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     )
                              )
          Plaintiff,          )
                              )
     v.                       )          Civil Action No. 97-CV-207
                              )
Robert R. Raymond, et al.,    )
                              )
          Defendants.         )
______________________________)

DEFENDANT RAYMOND'S LOCAL RULE 6.02 STATEMENT

On October 16, 1998 at 8:25 a.m. central standard time, defendant Robert R. Raymond conferred via telephone with Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, in her capacity as counsel for plaintiff United States of America.  During the conversation, Ms. Trissell was located in Washington, D.C., and defendant Raymond was located in Grafton, Wisconsin.  The parties discussed the fact that plaintiff had objected to nearly all of defendants' discovery requests to that date, including Raymond's requests for admissions, written interrogatories, and document production requests, and further, Raymond's position that he was entitled to full responses.  Ms. Trissell indicated that plaintiff would not reconsider answering any discovery requests it had previously objected to.  Accordingly, the parties were unable to reach an accord on this issue, and are at an impasse.

Further, on February 4, 1999, at 12:25 p.m. Central Standard Time, defendant Raymond conferred again with Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, in her capacity as counsel for plaintiff United States of America, in an effort to resolve disputed discovery requests made by defendants after the October 14th conference.  During this second conversation, Ms. Trissell was located in Washington, D.C., and defendant Raymond was located in Grafton, Wisconsin.  The parties discussed the fact that plaintiff had again objected to nearly all of defendants' discovery requests after the October 14th conference, including requests for admissions, written interrogatories, and document production requests.  Ms. Trissell again indicated that plaintiff's refusal to answer any discovery requests it had objected to on relevancy or privilege grounds was a final position, and that there would be no future reconsideration of that final position.  Accordingly, the parties were unable to reach an accord on this issue, and are at an impasse.

Dated on this the fifth day of February, A.D. 1999.

Certificate of Service

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that true and correct copies of the foregoing "Defendants' Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery and Sanctions Against Plaintiff United States of America", "Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery and Sanctions Against Plaintiff United States of America", "Defendant Bernhoft's Local Rule 6.02 Statement", and "Defendants Raymond's Local Rule 6.02 Statement", were placed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on February 16, A.D. 1999, addressed to:

Robert D. Metcalfe III
Senior Trial Attorney, Interstate Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 7238
Ben Franklin Station
Washington D. C. 20044

Thomas P. Schneider
U. S. Attorney
517 East Wisconsin Ave.
Room 530
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

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